Files
openssh-portable/sshd-auth.c
T
[email protected] bebc855fdb upstream: big refactor of sshd config management code.
This generates much of the initialisation, defaults and keyword table
code from a set of macros rather than hand coding them. These same
macros are also used to generate serialisation and deserialisation
code.

The macros are admittedly ugly but have the advantage of forcing a
good degree of consistency across places that need to stay in sync
with each other.

The new de/serialisation code is used to pass configurations across
the various sshd-* process boundaries. This removes the need to pass
around raw text configurations that need to be re-parsed as well as
eliminating some raw pointer leakage across the processes where
structures were previously clumsily serialised.

feedback/ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9a5109a480637e08c290eeb82aa8ef2ca7e848ce
2026-05-31 22:23:40 +10:00

839 lines
21 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: sshd-auth.c,v 1.15 2026/05/31 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/tree.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sk-api.h"
#include "srclimit.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "dh.h"
/* Privsep fds */
#define PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define PRIVSEP_LOG_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
static int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
static int have_agent = 0;
u_int num_hostkeys;
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
/* variables used for privilege separation */
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;
/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
struct ssh *the_active_state;
/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Included files from the configuration file */
struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
static struct ssh_sandbox *box;
#endif
/* XXX stub */
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
return 0;
}
static void
privsep_child_demote(void)
{
gid_t gidset[1];
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL)
fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
#endif
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/*
* Drop our privileges
* NB. Can't use setusercontext() after chroot.
*/
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
}
/* sandbox ourselves */
#ifdef HAVE_PLEDGE
if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
fatal_f("pledge()");
#else
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
#endif
}
static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
int r;
if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key;
char *ret;
u_int i;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b,
"[email protected]");
append_hostkey_type(b,
"[email protected]");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
debug_f("%s", ret);
return ret;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct sshkey *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
key = host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
continue;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
continue;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
return key;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* XXX remove */
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return NULL;
}
/* XXX remove */
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
return NULL;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return host_pubkeys[ind];
}
int
get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeGiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
parse_hostkeys(struct sshbuf *hostkeys)
{
int r;
u_int num_keys = 0;
struct sshkey *k;
const u_char *cp;
size_t len;
while (sshbuf_len(hostkeys) != 0) {
if (num_keys > 2048)
fatal_f("too many hostkeys");
host_pubkeys = xrecallocarray(host_pubkeys,
num_keys, num_keys + 1, sizeof(*host_pubkeys));
host_certificates = xrecallocarray(host_certificates,
num_keys, num_keys + 1, sizeof(*host_certificates));
/* public key */
k = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
host_pubkeys[num_keys] = k;
if (k)
debug2_f("key %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
/* certificate */
k = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(hostkeys, &cp, &len)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "extract pubkey");
if (len != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(cp, len, &k)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse pubkey");
host_certificates[num_keys] = k;
if (k)
debug2_f("cert %u: %s", num_keys, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
num_keys++;
}
num_hostkeys = num_keys;
}
static void
recv_privsep_state(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *o, uint64_t *timing_secretp)
{
struct sshbuf *hostkeys;
debug3_f("begin");
mm_get_state(ssh, o, NULL, timing_secretp,
&hostkeys, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
parse_hostkeys(hostkeys);
sshbuf_free(hostkeys);
debug3_f("done");
}
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, have_key = 0;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, rexeced_flag = 0;
u_int i;
mode_t new_umask;
Authctxt *authctxt;
sigset_t sigmask;
uint64_t timing_secret = 0;
closefrom(PRIVSEP_MIN_FREE_FD);
sigemptyset(&sigmask);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
seed_rng();
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DGQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
/* ignore */
break;
case '6':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'f':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'c':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
case 'E':
case 'e':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
/* ignore */
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'b':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'p':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'g':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'k':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'h':
/* ignored */
break;
case 't':
case 'T':
case 'G':
case 'C':
fatal("test/dump modes not supported");
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'o':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'V':
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
exit(0);
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
if (!rexeced_flag)
fatal("sshd-auth should not be executed directly");
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, 1);
/* XXX can't use monitor_init(); it makes fds */
pmonitor = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pmonitor));
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
pmonitor->m_recvfd = PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD;
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = PRIVSEP_LOG_FD;
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
/* Connection passed by stdin/out */
if (inetd_flag) {
/*
* NB. must be different fd numbers for the !socket case,
* as packet_connection_is_on_socket() depends on this.
*/
sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
} else {
/* rexec case; accept()ed socket in ancestor listener */
sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
}
if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
error("stdfd_devnull failed");
debug("network sockets: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
fatal("Unable to create connection");
the_active_state = ssh;
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
/* Fetch our configuration */
if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new config buf failed");
setproctitle("%s", "[session-auth early]");
recv_privsep_state(ssh, &options, &timing_secret);
options.timing_secret = timing_secret; /* XXX eliminate from unpriv */
ssh_packet_set_qos(ssh, options.ip_qos_interactive,
options.ip_qos_bulk);
/* Reinit logging in case config set Level, Facility or Verbose. */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, 1);
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
debug("sshd-auth version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
privsep_chroot = (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
} else {
privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
}
endpwent();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
#endif
if (options.host_key_agent) {
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
have_agent = 1;
else
error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"",
options.host_key_agent);
}
if (options.num_host_key_files != num_hostkeys) {
fatal("internal error: hostkeys confused (config %u recvd %u)",
options.num_host_key_files, num_hostkeys);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (host_pubkeys[i] != NULL) {
have_key = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!have_key)
fatal("internal error: received no hostkeys");
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, 1);
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
/*
* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
* unmounted if desired.
*/
if (chdir("/") == -1)
error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* This is the child authenticating a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[session-auth]");
/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(sock_out);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(sock_in);
ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
server_process_channel_timeouts(ssh);
server_process_permitopen(ssh);
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
/* Set default key authentication options */
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
fatal("allocation failed");
/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new loginmsg failed");
auth_debug_reset();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
privsep_child_demote();
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
do_authentication2(ssh);
/*
* The unprivileged child now transfers the current keystate and exits.
*/
mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
sshauthopt_free(auth_opts);
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
exit(0);
}
int
sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
if (privkey) {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
} else {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
}
return 0;
}
/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *hkalgs = NULL, *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
const char *compression = NULL;
struct kex *kex;
int r;
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
compression = "none";
hkalgs = list_hostkey_types();
kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, options.kex_algorithms,
options.ciphers, options.macs, compression, hkalgs);
free(hkalgs);
if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
options.version_addendum)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
mm_sshkey_setcompat(ssh); /* tell monitor */
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
debug("client does not support rekeying");
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
kex_set_server_sig_algs(ssh, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
kex = ssh->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send test");
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
_exit(i);
}