continually at runtime based on what sessions/channels are open.
Previously, ssh(1) and sshd(8) would pick a QoS value when they
were started and use it for the whole connection. This could
produce suboptimal choices for the QoS value, e.g. for multiplexed
sessions that started interactive but picked up a sftp client,
or sessions that moved large amounts of data via port forwarding.
Now the QoS value will change to the non-interactive IPQoS whenever
a "non-interactive" channel is open; basically any channel that lacks
a tty other than agent forwarding.
This is important now that the default interactive IPQoS is EF
(Expedited Forwarding), as many networks are configured to allow
only relatively small amounts of traffic of this class and they will
aggressively deprioritise the entire connection if this is exceeded.
NB. because ssh(1) and sshd(8) now change IP_TOS/IPV6_TCLASS
continually via setsockopt(), this commit requires a recent pledge(2)
change that landed recently in the OpenBSD kernel. Please ensure
you have updated to a kernel from within the last two weeks before
updating OpenSSH.
with job@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 325fc41717eecdf5e4b534bfa8d66817425b840f
key fingerprint and algorithm (not just algorithm number) as well as making
it explicit which keys didn't load.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee3e77a0271ab502e653922c6d161b1e091f8fee
later during User token expansion we don't end up freeing a member of argv.
Spotted by anton@'s regress tests.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f671a4f5726b66d123b88b1fdd1a90581339955
with the exception of %r and %C which are self-referential. Requested in
bz#3477, ok djm@, man page improvements jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caeb46251ee073662f6f5864c6f7b92d8ac80fa8
matching on the remote command specified on the commandline.
Also relaxes matching rules for `Match tagged` to allow
`Match tagged ""` to match an empty tag value. This also works
for command.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00dcfea425bf58d824bf5e3464cfc2409121b60d
^x' commandline to be exactly two characters long. Avoids one by OOB read if
ssh is invoked as "ssh -e^ ..."
Spotted by Maciej Domanski in GHPR368
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: baa72bc60898fc5639e6c62de7493a202c95823d
This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
user's specified ProxyCommand.
To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
originally requested a tty; enables keystroke timing obfuscation for most
ControlPersist sessions. Spotted by naddy@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72783a26254202e2f3f41a2818a19956fe49a772
multiplexed cases (inc. ControlPersist). bz3589 bz3589 Based on patches by
Peter Chubb; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7a2976a54b93e6767dc846b85647e6ec26969ac
This adds a ssh_config(5) "Tag" directive and corresponding
"Match tag" predicate that may be used to select blocks of
configuration similar to the pf.conf(5) keywords of the same
name.
ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc08358e70e702b59ac3e591827e5a96141b06a3
algorithms that are valid for CA signing. Previous behaviour was to list all
signing algorithms, including certificate algorithms (OpenSSH certificates do
not support CA chains). part of bz3577; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99c2b072dbac0f44fd1f2269e3ff6c1b5d7d3e59
Previously ssh would incorrectly refuse to canonicalise the hostname
if ProxyJump was explicitly set to "none" when CanonicalizeHostname=yes
bz3567; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80a58e43c3a32f97361282f756ec8d3f37989efd
again. This was missed when the fallthrough in the switch case above it was
removed. OK deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5583e5d8f6d62a8a4215cfa95a69932f344c8120
This will forcibly close an open channel by simulating read/write errors,
draining the IO buffers and calling the detach function.
Previously the detach function was only ever called during channel garbage
collection, but there was no way to signal the user of a channel (e.g.
session.c) that its channel was being closed deliberately (vs. by the
usual state-machine logic). So this adds an extra "force" argument to the
channel cleanup callback to indicate this condition.
ok markus dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23052707a42bdc62fda2508636e624afd466324b
never write a name with bad characters to a known_hosts file.
reported by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9b25fa8b5490b49398471e0c9657b0cbc7a5ad
ssh(1). User authentication keys that fall beneath this limit will be
ignored. If a host presents a host key beneath this limit then the connection
will be terminated (unfortunately there are no fallbacks in the protocol for
host authentication).
feedback deraadt, Dmitry Belyavskiy; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 430e339b2a79fa9ecc63f2837b06fdd88a7da13a
muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam
Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47
Historicallly, hpdelim accepted ":" or "/" as a port delimiter between
hosts (or addresses) and ports. These days most of the uses for "/"
are no longer accepted, so there are several places where it checks the
delimiter to disallow it. Make hpdelim accept only ":" and use hpdelim2
in the other cases. ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e6420bd1be87590b6840973f5ad5305804e3102
[email protected]